Introduction
Governments worldwide have tried to control the Internet infrastructure and have adjusted their national statutes to enable these actions. Between 1995 and 2011, there were over 600 instances of government control over digital networks made by consolidated and unconsolidated democracies, authoritarian regimes and fragile states (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011) . One of these actions of governmental control was an Internet shutdown, the most extreme form of control over the Internet infrastructure. Earliest findings of this policy go back to 2005, and empirical evidence shows three possible ways it is used or might be used: a) by governments to deprive their own population from having Internet access, b) by governments to deprive different populations (other than their own) from having Internet access (as tool of cyber-warfare) and c) by private citizens or organizations to deprive specific populations from Internet access. This project will focus on attempts by governments to deprive their own populations from having Internet access for reasons of national security. c) From a cyber-security point of view, as a control mechanism to protect the critical infrastructure when a nation-state faces a cyber-attack (Murray, Zeadally, & Flowers, 2012 ) Despite its name, a kill switch device for the Internet does not actually exist. To stop all Internet activity, action must be taken on each of the following elements of the TCP/IP protocol: Internet service providers (ISPs), Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), fiber-optic cables, the Domain Name System (DNS) and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (Chang, 2013; Eagleman, 2012) .
3. National Security National security traditionally refers to the safety of the territory and population of a nation-state and by extension, to the policies adopted by its preservation (Paleri, 2008) . For some academics national security is a "constructed concept" for any nation-state at any given time. Multiple factors, like political priorities and the media, will play a role determining what issues must be securitized; those issues and are known as "security priorities" (Richards, 2012) . Seen as the "national interest," security priorities may change according to the nation-state's geopolitical position or external conflicts (Bobbitt, 2002; Richards, 2012) .
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework used in this project is the "Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School," also known as "securitization theory". This theory argues that security is a constructed concept, a specific type of politics applicable to a very broad set of issues in certain time (Buzan, 1998) . The securitization theory defines security as a "speech act that securitizes," and constitutes one or more "referent objects," which can be identified as the national interest. This theory has been selected for this project because the political speech about securitization has been oriented to construct "cyber issues" as "security problems," rather than regular political, economic, illegal or technical problems (Hansen, 2009; Williams, 2003) . Using the terms of the securitization theory, this study has the purpose of exploring the different justifications governments used in shutting down the Internet, an "extreme measure" to protect what they consider the "referent object," in order to guarantee the national security of a nationstate. The securitization theoretical framework identifies the following elements: a) Securitizing Actor: whoever "securitizes" something, b) Referent Object: thing to be protected, c) Audience: person to be convinced with the security speech and d) Extraordinary Measure: action (s) to protect the referent object.
Research Approach
This project is driven by two factors: a) To challenge the common belief that extreme forms of governmental control are only considered or applied by authoritarian regimes. b) The need to understand why democracies, self-proclaimed defenders of Internet freedom, used or considered using mechanisms of governmental control that these governments criticized in their official policy discourse.
Multiple Case-Study
By using the theoretical constructs of the Copenhagen School, this project will take the form of a multiple case study of five governments that justified shutting down the Internet, or considered doing it, and which provided public justification or legal documents that can be analyzed. 
Research Questions and Data Collection
The specific research questions that drive this project are: RQ1: What is the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon? RQ2: What justifications do democratic and hybrid regimes use to shut down or to consider shutting down the Internet?
Data collection followed a deep Internet research process which analyzed: a) News, articles, websites, blogs, and related artifacts (like videos, podcasts and social media platforms) related to the participation of private telecomm operators or government actions over private Internet infrastructure. b) Political speech of the securitizing agents c) National statutes: Internet law, Telecommunications law, Cyber security law, National security law
The collected documents were analyzed and coded following the categories of the rhetorical speech (Purpose, Audience, Persona, Tone, Evidence, Structure, Strategies) by using computerassisted qualitative data analysis software ATLAS-ti. The purpose of the coding process was to identify the main elements of the theoretical framework as explained in the next paragraph and to provide an answer for RQ2.
Preliminary Findings and Conclusion
A preliminary study revealed that, between 2005 and 2015, eleven governments attempted to shut down the Internet: a) nine authoritarian regimes, b) a hybrid regime and c) one wellconsolidated democracy. In the same period, two well-consolidated democracies and one hybrid regime considered giving legal protection to this form of government control (Cowie, 2014; Mora, 2014; OpenNet, 2013) . The research analysis suggests that the audiences governments attempt to address belong to the private sector, specifically, the private sector that owns the critical infrastructure and the private sector that controls massive communication means. Governments provided different justifications:
Democratic regimes that considered shutting down the Internet emphasized the protection of the critical infrastructure in case of a cyber-attack, however they also consider this extreme policy as a mechanism of social control when the public order is threatened. Democratic regimes that did use this form of government control claimed that it was an accident and denied their intention to use it for political purposes. Their population challenged that explanation.
Hybrid regimes blame foreign powers for the instability of their regimes and claim an "unclear" national interest threatened by the Internet. These regimes focus on maintaining control over the national information infrastructure and the protection of the communication platforms of the ruling party as their referent object.
From a policy point of view, these preliminary findings show two characteristics: a) depending upon the specific government, the power to order shutting down the Internet is generally concentrated in one governmental authority (usually the Executive branch), but accountability may vary, and b) there are legal frameworks that "legitimize" explicit or implicitly this extreme form of governmental control over the Internet. 
